to the modern-day family oligarchy of North Korea. The challenge for observers of capitalism over the past couple of centuries has been to determine whether capitalism as an economic system generates dynamic equalising forces to offset the age-old disequalising human pursuit of concentrated power and wealth.
Piketty's answer is no. If one takes away the redistributive apparatus of the welfare state, along with the other particular factors (wars, revolutions, the Great Depression, and sustained rapid growth) that made the 20th century an era of unprecedented equality, the equations that describe the underlying dynamics of capitalism, combined with some plausible propositions about ownership of wealth, predict the re-emergence and entrenchment of dynastic elites holding a commanding share of the economy's wealth, and collecting -as the return on that wealth -a substantial rental share of the national product. In the long run, Piketty argues, capitalism and equality can coexist only if the disequalising dynamics of wealth accumulation are checked by collective will.
Limiting inequality is therefore a central and permanent task for democratic government. Piketty's main policy conclusion is: 'If we are to regain control of capitalism, we must bet everything on democracy' (Picketty, 2014, p.573) . So: (1) Have 'we' lost control of capitalism? (2) Is uncontrolled capitalism truly headed towards gross inequality and the oligarchy of a patrimonial rentier class? These surely are questions to which mainstream neoclassical economics ought to have ready answers.
Piketty has made such an impact on the professional world of economists precisely because he has politely but firmly pointed out that the ready answers are not forthcoming. At the same time he has made such an impact on the general informed public because his work has appeared at a time when inequality and growth are central issues in the public mind, and the answers offered by mainstream economists are widely recognised to be unsatisfactory.
Neoclassical economics -the dominant school of economic thought throughout the 20th century -grew out of the great 19th-century debates over the justice of distributional outcomes under capitalism. The neoclassicals' marginal-productivity theory of income distribution asserted that in a competitive market system each of the aggregate inputs to productionlabour, capital, land, entrepreneurship -would be paid in line with its direct productive contribution, satisfying the essential test of justice in distribution of the product. As one of the leading developers of the theory put it, 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Per capita income in some rich countries: Maddison data For the neoclassical story to have credibility in explaining the share of the product going to 'capital' , there would have to be a clear long-run relationship between capital accumulation and growth of the product. The historical statistics do not show this (see Figure 1) . Equally, there would have to be a clear relationship between labour productivity and real wages; in practice that relationship has been missing, at least since the 1970s (for the New Zealand case, see Figure 2 and Rosenberg, 2015) .
Piketty simply sets aside the neoclassical hypothesis that the primary income distribution flows from the production process. He replaces it with the proposition that 'capital' -defined to include all assets that yield a reliable stream of income, regardless of whether they are directly involved in productive activity or not -exercises a direct claim to appropriate a share of the product that is determined not by productive contribution but rather by the stock of accumulated wealth multiplied by the long-run rate of return on wealth of 4-5%. The wealth-owners' claim is simply rent, and it is taken not in return for active productive effort but as a property right, enforced by the laws and institutions of private property. Because this rent claim is prior to any other claims, the non-wealth-owning part of the population is left to share out what is left of the product after the rentiers' claim has been met; only at this second stage does the marginal-productivity theory have potential bite.
The owners of wealth comprise two groups: those who have worked to earn their fortunes, and those who have simply inherited their wealth (Warren Buffet's 'lucky sperm club'). As today's working entrepreneurs and chief executives age they become rentiers, and as their heirs take over their wealth, the right to collect rents continually drifts away from whatever original basis private fortunes may have had in productive endeavour.
Of course, if all wealth ('capital') were collectively-owned and the rents equally shared, inequality would not follow from a rising rent share. But private property in wealth, combined with a tendency towards concentration of its ownership (which Piketty predicts on the basis of economies of scale and scope in the management of wealth portfolios) imply an increasing division of the population into haves and the have-nots, until an equilibrium is established in which the ratio of wealth to output is stable. The identification of this equilibrium has been Piketty's central new contribution to economic theory (Bertram, 2014 The diagram relates the size of the total product to its distribution, showing that over a range of 'social cooperation' from O up to M the welfare of all can be expanded (economists call this a 'pareto gain'). Beyond M (Rawls' 'maximin' , where the welfare of the poorest is maximised), the benefits of any further economic expansion go only to the rich. In addition, further welfare gains for the rich can be secured by redistributing income upwards at the expense of the poor. At the extreme point F lies the social order that Rawls characterises as 'feudalism' , where the rich cannot be made better off however hard the poor are squeezed.
Piketty's theoretical model identifies an equilibrium for wealth accumulation and consequent income inequality that lies somewhere along the Rawls linepotentially (but not necessarily) between M and F. The big political issue Piketty identifies is whether this equilibrium inequality lies inside or outside the limit of democratic 'tolerance' . If the Piketty equilibrium is to the left of point T, then it is politically as well as economically sustainable. If it is to the right of T, then political unsustainability implies eventual 'euthanasia of the rentier' by some means -either a moderate programme of asset taxes along the lines Piketty proposes, or a more drastic, potentially revolutionary, rupture in the social fabric. The tolerance threshold itself, of course, is not necessarily fixed over time; the political aim of any oligarchy is to shift it right in the diagram, while pro-poor policy activism shifts it left.
The New Zealand dimension 1: incomes
Piketty's work has been focused on the large developed economies, and the economic dynamics he identifies operate primarily in those economies, with global ramifications as the spillovers from large-country trends flow through global markets. For a small country on the capitalist periphery, the basic policy choice is whether to live with those spillovers, or to insulate the local economy and society from them. New Zealand has conspicuously opted to remain wide open to global forces, and it is therefore not really surprising that Piketty's historical data show distributional trends in this country to have been strongly driven from offshore. Figure 4 traces the income share of the top 1% in the five 'Anglo' economies, while Figure 5 shows the inverse Pareto coefficient (Piketty's preferred statistical measure of inequality) for the same group of countries. These charts show that New Zealand, along with Australia, has been swept along by the rising global tide of inequality since 1980. 1910 1913 1916 1919 1922 1925 1928 1931 1934 1937 1940 1943 1946 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1914 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 Galling as it may be for New Zealanders who like to think we make our own history, it appears that Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson were not so much big policy innovators as simply pawns in the new global order. Rather than initiating big economic changes, their key contribution as finance ministers was to facilitate rather than resist global spillovers. Their deregulation, privatisation, slashing of benefit levels, union-busting and destruction of collective bargaining simply sufficed to keep New Zealand in line with the rest of the Anglo realm. Countries that did not join the early drive to inequalityfor example, the continental European countries and Japan -were ones whose policy elites resisted the neo-liberal policy tsunami (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011) . Lack of pushback against imported neo-liberal dogma was the central feature of New Zealand policy making in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The New Zealand dimension 2: wealth
While public discussion of Piketty's work has focused mainly on the distribution of incomes, the long-run core of his model is the accumulation and concentration of rent-yielding wealth, which is what he calls 'capital' . Piketty charts the longrun evolution of his 'capital' relative to national income for the large developed economies, including Australia for 1970-2010, but not New Zealand (Piketty, 2014 , part 2). To fill this gap I have constructed Table 1 combining Reserve Bank figures on private household wealth with data on the net worth of government from the Crown accounts, and the international investment position as measured in the national accounts, all measured in years of GDP (shown here as percentages of annual GDP). This procedure replicates in essence the methodology used for Australia by Piketty and Zucman (2014;  data set at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/ files/capitalisback/Australia.xls, accessed 19 September 2014). Household and government net wealth are at June of each year, 1 while the GDP figures used as denominator are for March years, and the international investment position is at March of each year. These timing discrepancies imply only minor distortions in the overall figures. Government net worth was not reported prior to 1993 but was below 10% of GDP, which is negligibly small relative to private wealth, which was around 250% (two and a half years) of GDP in the mid-1990s. Table 1 and Figure 7 show the results. The productive capital stock as conventionally measured is shown also, to emphasise the distinction between Piketty's definition of 'capital' and the conventional measure used for national accounting purposes. Gini coefficient x100 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 % of GDP Foreign-owned assets Government net worth Other household net assets Housing 'Productive' capital stock Rich List wealth National wealth excl foreign-owned assets 'capital' in New Zealand, compared with 64% in Australia, 57% in Britain, 61% in France, 56% in Germany, 42% in the US and 51% in Canada (data from http://piketty. pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/xls/). Analyses of inequality in wealth distribution, and the consequent distribution of the rent share of the product, therefore need to focus particularly on ownership of the housing stock.
• There is a sharp upward step change visible in Figure 7 between 2002 and 2008. This came a decade later than the step change in income inequality seen in Figure 6 ; as one would expect, wealth inequality flowed from and followed on from the sharp increase in income inequality. The radical change in the distribution of after-tax income in the early 1990s raised the savings capacity of the top income groups while squeezing the lower income tiers out of savingindeed, into negative saving in many cases (see Figure 9) . Consequently, when the boom in wealth during the 2000s occurred, driven by rapid capital gains as well as by savings of high-income recipients, the benefits were very unequally distributed, entrenching the advantages of the wealthiest groups. One indicator of this is the NBR Rich List's wealth, which rose from less than 2% of total wealth in 1989 to 8% by 2013.
(While not statistically robust, the Rich List does capture the very top end of the wealth distribution, and the evidence it offers of growing concentration is plausible.) When the 1980-2014 New Zealand series for Piketty's beta (total 'capital' measured as a percentage of GDP) are arrayed alongside Piketty's capitalstock data for other countries we obtain Figure 8 , which shows that in wealth accumulation as in income distribution, New Zealand has been closely tracking the trend in the other Anglo economies.
Saving and the distribution of wealth ownership
Having shown that there are very strong convergence forces at work pulling New show their financial liabilities steady at about one-third of GDP from 1978 until 1989, but then surging to 106% of GDP in 2007, on the eve of the global financial crisis. While some of this increase in borrowing was due to home owners cashing in on increased equity as house prices rose, a substantial part is likely to be due to distress borrowing by low-income households struggling to maintain their previous living standards.
Strongly suggestive of the way in which the sharp increase in income inequality in 1988-94 has affected the saving capacity of different groups, and hence their ability to accumulate wealth, are the results of a Statistics New Zealand decomposition of the savings data in the 2007 national accounts, shown in Figures 9 and 10. These show very large dis-saving by the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution, and negative aggregate savings for both wage and salary earners and transfer recipients. Positive savings were concentrated in the top income quintile, and among the groups receiving income from property income and self-employment, most notably the former. Since Piketty's total capital grows both by savings and by capital gains, the combined effect of concentrated savings and capital gains to those already holding assets is likely to have been in the direction of increasing concentration of private wealth.
Conclusion
Although the broad outlines of New Zealand's distributional trends have been imported (along with a neo-liberal policy stance) from the global economy, it is possible to identify the specific local mechanisms at work here that have reproduced the trends in global capitalism It is not clear at this point, however, how great the tolerance of the New Zealand public for growing inequality will prove to be (see Morrison, 2015) .
The 2014 election results seem to indicate that the limits of democratic tolerance have not yet been approached. But if the disequalising dynamics predicted by Piketty continue to run their course overseas, the case for re-establishing a more autonomous policy realm in this country can be expected to strengthen.
